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Abstract
This Note argues that the Court should interpret the EEC Treaty to admit actions brought
by independent Community importers. Part I of this Note examines the structure of Community
antidumping proceedings. Part II sets forth the two methods that permit private parties to seek
judicial review of antidumping regulations. Part III argues that admission to the Court should not
be restricted so as to exclude independent importers. This Note concludes that allowing indepen-
dent importers to challenge directly antidumping regulations is necessary to provide equality of
treatment, and that such actions neither undermine the Community policy nor destroy the structure
of the Community judiciary.
THE INDEPENDENT IMPORTER'S RIGHT OF REVIEW
OF ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS BEFORE
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (the "EEC Treaty")' limits direct actions by private parties
challenging measures of the European Economic Community
(the "Community" or the "EEC").2 The Council of Ministers
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) (official English version), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty or Treaty]. The EEC is currently
comprised of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. See Treaty Between the Member States of the European Com-
munities and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic Concerning the
Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. L 302/9
(1985).
2. See, e.g., Allied Corporation v. Commission,Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1005, 1031, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,127 (denying
admission to independent importer of chemical fertilizer in antidumping case);
Alusuisse v. Council and Commission, Case 307/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3463, 3473, 14,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8244 (denying admission to independent im-
porter of orthoxylene in antidumping case); Wagner v. Commission, Case 162/78,
1979 E.C.R. 3467, 3488, 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8623, at 7394 (denying
admission to sugar exporters to challenge Commission regulation concerning export
refunds); Soci&6 des Usines de Beauport v. Council, Joined Cases 103 to 109/78,
1979 E.C.R. 17, 25, 23, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8531, at 7631 (denying admis-
sion to sugar-producing undertakings challenging Council regulation providing for
reduction of quotas by Member States); Compagnie Fran~aise Commerciale v. Com-
mission, Case 64/69, 1970 E.C.R. 221, 227, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8091,
at 8323 (denying admission to applicant challenging Commission regulation con-
cerning agricultural policy); Glucoseries R~unies v. Commission, Case 1/64, 1964
E.C.R. 413, 417, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8024, at 7407 (denying admission to a
Community manufacturer who sought annulment of Commission decision providing
for countervailing duties on certain agricultural products); Plaumann v. Commission,
Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 107-08, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8013, at 7274
(denying admission to importer who challenged Council regulation that refused to
suspend certain custom duties); Producteurs de Fruits v. Council (Fruits and Vegeta-
bles), Joined Cases 16 & 17/62, 1962 E.C.R. 471, 480, 3, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8005, at 7187 (denying admission to a fruit growers association challenging
a Council regulation concerning agricultural policy); cf. Dinnage, Locus Standi and Arti-
cle 173 EEC: The Effect of Metro SB Grossmnurkte v. Conmmission, 4 EUR. L. REV. 15, 18
(1979) (noting that from outset Court has taken a narrow approach); Rasmussen,
Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?, 5 EUR. L. REV. 112 (1980) (argu-
ing that Court's interpretation is restrictive).
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(the "Council"), the Commission of the European Communi-
ties (the "Commission"), and the Member States, however, en-
joy unfettered access to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (the "Court ofJustice" or the "Court"). 3 Within
the past decade certain private parties have succeeded in gain-
ing admission to the Court to challenge antidumping regula-
tions. The Court has permitted exporters4 and non-EEC pro-
ducers,5 and their EEC subsidiaries,6 to bring direct actions.
In addition, the Court has permitted representatives of Com-
munity industries7 and individual Community producers8 to
bring direct actions. The Court has not admitted, however, in-
dependent Community importers. 9
This Note argues that the Court should interpret the EEC
Treaty to admit actions brought by independent Community
importers. Part I of this Note examines the structure of Com-
munity antidumping proceedings. Part II sets forth the two
methods that permit private parties to seek judicial review of
3. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 57, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75. The relevant portion provides that "[t]he Court ofJustice shall re-
view the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission other than recommenda-
tions or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a
Member State, the Council or the Commission . I..." Id.; see Bebr, Direct and Indirect
Judicial Control of Community Acts in Practice: The Relation Between Articles 173 and 177 of
the EEC Treaty, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1984) (referring to Council, Oommission, and
Member States as "privileged" plaintiffs).
4. See, e.g., Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1030, 14, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,084, at 15,127; NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council (Ball Bearings),
Case 113/77, 1979 E.C.R. 1185, 1205, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at
8342.
5. See, e.g., Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1030, 14, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,084, at 15,127; Ball Bearings, 1979 E.C.R. at 1205, 12, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8342.
6. See, e.g., Tokyo Electric v. Council (Electric Typewriters), Joined Cases
260/85 & 106/86, 1988 E.C.R. -, -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,512, at
18,832; Ball Bearings, 1979 E.C.R. at 1205, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574,
at 8342.
7. See, e.g., Fediol v. Commission, Case 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, 2929, 2936,
1, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013 at 14,170, 14,173.
8. See, e.g., Electric Typewriters, 1988 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,512, at 18,832; Timex v. Council and Commission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R.
849, 866, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,782.
9. See Alusuisse v. Council and Commission, Case 307/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3463,
3471, 3473, 4 3, 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8242, 8244. An in-
dependent importer is a party in the Community that purchases products from an
exporter or manufacturer, but with whom there exists no affiliation. Id. at 3471, 3,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8242.
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antidumping regulations. Part III argues that admission to the
Court should not be restricted so as to exclude independent
importers. This Note concludes that allowing independent im-
porters to challenge directly antidumping regulations is neces-
sary to provide equality of treatment, and that such actions
neither undermine Community policy nor destroy the struc-
ture of the Community judiciary.
I. THE NATURE OF ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS
Antidumping laws penalize foreign trade practices that in-
volve price discrimination and injure a domestic industry.'
Such practices typically involve the sale of a product at a lower
price in the importing country than that charged in the country
of origin." Exporters and producers often engage in this
practice to increase their market share.' "
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")13 provides a uniform international framework for
the supervision of antidumping laws enacted by the signatory
10. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW 41 (1986);
J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1966).
11. Council Regulation No. 2423/88 of July 11, 1988 on Protection Against
Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Eco-
nomic Community, art. 2(2)-(3), O.J. L 209/1, at 4 (1988) [hereinafter Antidumping
Regulation]. See generally E. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (1987) (discussing antidumping
practices).
12. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 44. Additional reasons that an
exporter might dump include: to establish itself in a market, to maintain market posi-
tion, to eliminate competitors, or to maximize short term profits. Id. The authors
note that for the purposes of an antidumping action, the exporters' motive is irrele-
vant, because the antidumping laws are "concerned with the effect of dumping rather
than its cause." Id.
13. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is attached to the Final Act of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, which was signed in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, on October 30, 1947. It is in force by virtue of the Protocol of
Provisional Application, signed by the original parties to GATT, and the subsequent
accession protocols signed by new members. 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT]. The text of the agreement as amended to date
was published in 1969 by GAF. 4 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
(1969) [hereinafter BISD]. In 1979 the GATT Code was amended by the Tokyo
Round. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, BISD (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter Tokyo Round]. For a further
discussion of the EEC and the Tokyo Round negotiations, see J. JACKSON, J. LOUIS &
M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND 21-76 (1984).
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parties. 14 In accordance with GATT,15 EEC proceedings are
conducted pursuant to the procedures in Council Regulation
No. 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on Protection Against Dumped or
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (the "Antidumping Regula-
tion").' 6
A. Antidumping Investigations
Under the Antidumping Regulation, investigations begin
with a petition to the Commission either from a Community
industry or a Member State requesting an investigation of al-
leged dumping.' 7 The Commission, which conducts the inves-
14. Toyko Round, supra note 13, art. VI, at 171; E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at
4. One commentator writes:
International supervision of national antidumping laws takes place within
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Article VI of the General
Agreement condemns injurious dumping, but is mainly devoted to interna-
tional control of anti dumping action. To a certain extent this emphasis fol-
lows logically from the definition of dumping as price discrimination, prac-
ticed by private individuals. GAIT addresses governmental behavior and
therefore could not possibly prohibit dumping.
Id. (emphasis in original).
15. Toyko Round, supra note 13, art. 1, at 171-72. Article 1 provides:
The imposition of an anti-dumping duty is a measure to be taken only under
the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the General Agreement and
pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. The following provisions govern the application of
Article VI of the General Agreement in so far as action is taken under anti-
dumping legislation or regulations.
Id.
16. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11. The EEC has maintained exclusive
jurisdiction over antidumping law in the Member States since 1968 with the enact-
ment of Council Regulation No. 459/68, OJ. L 92/1 (1968). J. BESELER & A. WIL-
LIAMS,supra note 10, at 23, 33; E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 7.
The Antidumping Regulation has been amended several times since 1968. See
Council Regulation No. 2011/73, O.J. L 206/3 (1973); Council Regulation No.
1411/77, O.J. L 160/4 (1977); Council Regulation No. 1681/79; O.J. L 196/1
(1979); Council Regulation No. 3017/79, O.J. L 339/1 (1979); Council Regulation
No. 1580/82, OJ. L 178/9 (1982); Council Regulation No. 2176/84, OJ. L 201/1
(1984), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3821, at 3001. For a discussion of these amend-
ments, seeJ. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 21-29.
17. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 5, at 8. Article 5 provides in
relevant part:
1. Any natural or legal person, or any association not having legal person-
ality, acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers itself in-
jured or threatened by dumped or subsidized imports may lodge a written
complaint.
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tigation, then submits questionnaires to all known 8 exporters
and importers of the allegedly dumped merchandise, and pos-
sibly to the petitioning Community producers as well, in order
to gather the information that is necessary to determine
whether the merchandise has been dumped.' 9 These parties
are encouraged to cooperate and provide information, be-
cause, under the "best information available" rule, the Com-
mission is permitted to make determinations on the basis of
whatever facts are available.2 0  Thus, if exporters, non-EEC
producers, and EEC importers fail to provide relevant infor-
mation, the Commission may use data provided solely by the
Community industry. 2' Information provided by the Commu-
nity industry or party petitioning the Commission for relief is
probably more likely to result in the imposition of a higher
duty than if information was also provided by the non-EEC
2. The complaint shall contain sufficient evidence of the existence of
dumping or subsidization and the injury resulting therefrom.
6. Where, in the absence of any complaint, a Member State is in posses-
sion of sufficient evidence both of dumping or subsidization and of injury
resulting therefrom for a Community industry, it shall immediately commu-
nicate such evidence to the Commission.
Id.; seeJ. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 175-83 (regarding specific content
of a complaint).
18. "Known" parties normally include only those non-EEC producers, export-
ers, and importers identified in the petitioner's complaint. E. VERMULST, supra note
11, at 205-06.
19. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 7(2)(a), at 9. Article 7(2)(a)
provides: "The Commission shall seek all information it deems to be necessary and,
where it considers it appropriate, examine and verify the records of importers, ex-
porters, traders, agents, producers, trade associations and organizations." Id. The
questionnaire requests pricing information over the last five years, including infor-
mation on a transaction-by-transaction basis on prices charged by the non-EEC pro-
ducers in "their home market, the Community market and other export markets
.E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 205. Information on cost of production may
also be requested. Id.
20. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 7(7)(b), at 10. Article 7(7)(b)
further provides that the Commission may make the determination on the basis of
facts available if information is not provided within a reasonable period or if an inter-
ested party significantly impedes the investigation. Id. The "best information avail-
able" may be obtained from any published material or data obtained from other par-
ties who have cooperated with the investigation if certain parties fail to provide rele-
vant information. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 191-92; E. VERMULST,
supra note 11, at 207-08.
21. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 7(7)(b), at 10; E. VERMULST,
supra note 11, at 208.
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producers, exporters, and EEC importers. 22 The Commission
will usually independently verify the data received before issu-
ing preliminary findings.23 The Commission also makes avail-
able to a party all relevant information submitted to the Com-
mission that could be of aid to a party's defense, subject to
certain restrictions.
24
After reviewing this information, the Commission deter-
mines whether a product has been dumped. A product has
been dumped when the export price 25 to the Community is
less than the normal value 26 in the country of origin or the ex-
22. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 444. Community complainants will tend to
miscalculate pricing information so as to increase the dumping margin. Id. More-
over, the Commission may use import statistics declared by exporters in the past,
which are used to calculate customs duties. Id. The use of these figures in an an-
tidumping investigation is likely to result in a higher dumping margin than if the
exporter had provided more reliable information. Id.
23. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 7(2)(a), at 9. Verification and
further fact finding may be made during on-site inspections at the premises of the
non-EEC producers, exporters, and importers and EEC producers and trade associa-
tions concerned. Id. art. 7(3)(a), at 9.
24. Id. art. 7(4)(a), at 9. Article 7(4)(a) states:
The complainant and the importers and exporters known to be concerned,
as well as the representatives of the exporting country, may inspect all infor-
mation made available to the Commission by any party to an investigation as
distinct from internal documents prepared by the authorities of the Commu-
nity or its Member States, provided that it is relevant to the defence of their
interest and not confidential within the meaning of Article 8 and that it is
used by the Commission in the investigation. To this end, they shall address
a written request to the Commission indicating the information required.
Id. Where requested, confidential treatment is given to information provided by in-
terested parties. Id. art. 8, at 10. Information received in an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty investigation may not be used for other purposes. Id. Thus, confiden-
tial treatment serves to encourage non-EEC parties to participate in the investigation
and provide information that may be sensitive. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note
10, at 200-01.
Interested parties may also request a hearing with the Commission where there
are specific reasons why the party should be heard orally. Antidumping Code, supra
note 11, art. 7(5), at 10.
25. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 1I, art. 2(8)(a), at 5. Article 2(8)(a) pro-
vides that the export price equals the price that is "actually paid or payable for the
product sold for export to the Community ...." Id. In instances "where the foreign
exporter sells directly to an independent EC importer, the price that the exporter
charges the importer constitutes the export price." E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at
439.
26. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 2(3)(a), at 4. Article 2(3)(a)
states that the normal value is "the comparable price actually paid or payable in the
ordinary course of trade for the like product intended for consumption in the export-
ing country or country of origin." Id. A " 'like product' means a product which is
identical, i.e., alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in the ab-
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porting country. 27 The dumping margin equals the difference
between the normal value and the export price 2  and is used to
determine the amount of the duty to be imposed. 9
There are situations where the normal value and the ex-
port value must be determined by constructing such values."
For example, the Commission will construct the normal value
where the product under investigation is not sold in the home
market of the producer or exporter or where, if sales do exist,
a proper comparison is not possible."
The Commission will construct the export price where the
Commission finds that there is no export price or where it ap-
pears that there is an association or a compensatory arrange-
ment between the exporter and the importer or a third party.32
In addition, the Commission will construct the export price
where, for some reason, the Commission determines that the
price actually paid or payable is unreliable.3
sence of such a product, another product which has characteristics closely resembling
those of the product under consideration." Id. art. 2(12), at 6. For a further discus-
sion of normal value, see J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 52-57; E.
VERMULST, supra note 1I, at 416-2 1.
27. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 2(2), (6), at 4-5. Article 2(6)
allows the Commission to calculate the normal value based on the price of the prod-
uct in the exporting country if the origin of the product was not that country. Id. For
a more detailed discussion of calculating margins, see J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS,
supra note 10, at 73; E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 416-80.
28. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 2(14), at 6.
29. Id. art. 13(3), at 12.
30. Id. arts. 2(3)(b), (8)(b), at 4-5.
31. Id. art. 2(3)(b), at 4. A proper comparison of the price in the home market
and the price charged in the Community may not be possible where the physical
characteristics of the product are altered; where import charges and indirect taxes are
attached to the product when consumed in the home market but are not levied if the
product is exported; or where various selling expenses affect the price. Id. art. 2(9),
at 5. When constructing the normal value, the Commission must add the cost of
production and a reasonable margin of profit. Id. art. 2(3)(b)(ii), at 4. For a more
detailed discussion of these factors, see, J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at
84-112.
32. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 2(8)(b), at 5.
33. Id. Article 2(8)(b) provides:
[T]he export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the
imported product is first resold to an independent buyer, or if the product is
not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition im-
ported, on any reasonable basis. In such cases, allowance shall be made for
all costs incurred between importation [into the Community] and resale and
for a reasonable profit margin.
Id. The costs incurred between importation into the Community and resale may in-
clude "(i) usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs; (ii) cus-
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If the Commission determines that a product has been
dumped, a duty will be imposed only after consultation with
the advisory committee established by the Antidumping Regu-
lation (the "Advisory Committee")3 4 and then only if the
dumped product causes injury to a Community industry. 5
Under the "lesser duty" rule, the Commission may recom-
mend a duty less than the dumping margin if that "duty would
be adequate to remove the injury."36
toms duties, any anti-dumping duties and other taxes payable in the importing coun-
try by reason of the importation or sale of the goods; (iii) a reasonable margin for
overheads and profit and/or any commission usually paid or agreed." Id.
34. Article 6(1) of the Antidumping Regulation provides that the Advisory Com-
mittee "shall consist of representatives of each Member State, with a representative
of the Commission as chairman." Id. art. 6(1), at 8. Under article 11(2), the Com-
mission must consult the Advisory Committee with regard to provisional duties. Id.
art. 11(2), at 11. Article 6(4) dictates that consultations shall cover:
(a) the existence of dumping or of a subsidy and methods of establishing
the dumping margin or the amount of the subsidy;
(b) the existence and extent of injury;
(c) the causal link between the dumped or subsidized imports and injury;
(d) the measures which, in the circumstances, are appropriate to prevent or
remedy the injury caused by dumping or the subsidy and the ways and
means for putting such measures into effect.
Id. art. 6(4), at 8.
35. Id. art. 4(1), at 7. An injury will be found "only if the dumped or subsidized
imports are, through the effects of dumping or subsidization .... causing or threaten-
ing to cause material injury to an established Community industry or materially
retarding the establishment of such an industry." Id. The Commission considers the
volume and price of dumped imports and the consequent impact on the Community
industry as indicated by certain trends in economic factors, such as production, utili-
zation of capacity, stocks, sales, market share, prices, profits, return on investment,
cash flow, and employment. Id. art. 4(2), at 7.
The Commission may also find injury
even where a major proportion of the total Community industry is not in-
jured, provided there is a concentration of dumped or subsidized imports
into such an isolated market and provided further that the dumped or subsi-
dized imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the
production within such market.
Id. art. 4(5), at 8.
When determining whether a duty should be imposed, the Commission and the
Advisory Committee also consider the "interest of the Community" in such a mea-
sure. See Stanbrook, The Impact of Community Interest and Injury Determination on An-
tidumping Measures in the EEC, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 623, 625 (B. Hawk ed.
1986) (" '[I]nterests of the Community' is not defined anywhere in the Antidumping
Regulation but it clearly refers to the overall interests of the Community and not just
to those of the . . . [petitioning] domestic industry.").
36. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 13(3), at 12.
It is significant that international rules have always focused more on the
trade-distorting effects of antidumping action than on the effects of the
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After consulting with the Advisory Committee, and after
the first stage of the investigation, the Commission may issue
regulations for the imposition of provisional duties to prevent
injury during the course of the proceedings.3 7 A provisional
duty is not collected until the investigation is completed.
With such a duty, the importer provides security for the
amount that may be finally imposed. 9 The security may be
either a cash deposit or a banker's guaranty.4 °
Before the conclusion of a full investigation, exporters
and non-EEC producers may offer to raise prices or revise the
volume of exports to a level deemed satisfactory to the Com-
mission.4' A promise to make such adjustment, known as an
undertaking,42 may be a substitute for the imposition of an an-
tidumping duty.4 3 An undertaking is considered more advan-
tageous to exporters, non-EEC producers, and importers who
may still profit from the per-unit increase in price, which may
compensate partly for any loss in volume of sales and avoids
dumping itself: the common denominator of all GATT refinements of the
antidumping regime over the last forty years has been that they limit the
freedom of the importing country to take protective action.
E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 2. Thus, Vermulst notes that the lesser duty rule
corresponds with the intent of the drafters of GATT in recommending administrative
discretion to prevent a windfall to Community producers where the injury suffered is
less than the dumping margin. Id. at 228-29.
37. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 11 (1), at 11. Article II provides
in part:
Where preliminary examination shows that dumping or a subsidy exists and
that there is sufficient evidence of injury caused thereby and the interests of
the Community call for intervention to prevent injury being caused during
the proceeding, the Commission, acting at the request of a Member State or
on its own initiative, shall impose a provisional anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duty.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 210-11. The authors note that
usually a banker's guaranty is provided, but that the form of the security that will be
accepted may depend "on the good standing of the importer concerned." Id.
41. Id. at 215.
42. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 1i, art. 10(1), at 11. This provision
requires that the Commission consult with the Advisory Committee prior to the ac-
ceptance of an undertaking. Id.
43. Id. The Antidumping Regulation provides that the Commission's ultimate
decision shall not be prcjudiced where the undertaking suggested by the Commission
is not offered by the non-EEC producer or exporter or if an offer of an undertaking is
rejected by the Commission. Id. art. 10(3), at 11.
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any additional duty on the goods.4 4
After a full investigation and consultation with the Advi-
sory Committee, the Commission submits its proposal to the
Council.45 The Council may impose definitive duties and make
definitive the collection of provisional duties imposed by the
Commission.46 The Council generally adopts the Commis-
sion's proposal4 7 and imposes duties by regulation. 48 Regula-
tions must detail the facts and reasons that are the bases for
the determination. 49 Thereafter, the Member States collect
the duties from the importer as the goods in question enter the
Community.5"
B. Administrative Review
Once a duty has been imposed, the Antidumping Regula-
tion provides for two types of administrative adjustment.51
Under the first procedure, a private party may request that the
Commission revise the regulation after demonstrating
changed circumstances sufficient to warrant review, provided
44. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 220; see Bourgeois, EC Antidumping Enforce-
ment-Selected Second Generation Issues, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 563, 588 (B.
Hawk ed. 1986); Hindley, Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community,
WORLD ECON. 445, 446 (1988).
45. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 12(l), at 12 (providing for con-
sulation with regard to the imposition of definitive duties).
46. Id. art. 12(1), (2)(a), at 12. The Council must approve such measures by a
qualified majority vote. Id.
47. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 196.
48. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 13(1), at 12. Article 13(1) pro-
vides that "[a]nti-dumping or countervailing duties, whether provisional or defini-
tive, shall be imposed by Regulation." Id. The EEC Treaty defines a regulation as a
measure that "shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 60, 298 U.N.T.S. at 78-79. Whereas, "[a] decision shall be
binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed." Id.
49. Antidumping Code, supra note 11, art. 13(2), at 12. The antidumping regu-
lation also specifies the product concerned, the type and amount of the duty im-
posed, the countries involved, and, where practicable, the suppliers involved. Id.
50. See id. art. 13(8), at 13. Article 13(8) provides that "[a]nti-dumping or coun-
tervailing duties shall be collected by Member States in the form, at the rate and
according to the other criteria laid down when the duties were imposed, and inde-
pendently of the customs duties, taxes and other charges normally imposed on im-
ports." Id.; see NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council (Ball Bearings), Case 113/77,
1979 E.C.R. 1185, 1205, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8342 (imple-
mentation of an antidumping regulation is purely automatic); J. BESELER & A. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 10, at 233.
51. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, arts. 14, 16, at 14-15.
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that at least one year has elapsed since the conclusion of the
investigation. 2 The second procedure allows EEC importers
to seek refunds where the importer can show that the duty col-
lected exceeds the actual dumping margin. 53 The Antidump-
ing Regulation does not provide, however, for judicial review
of the legality of the regulation.54
II. THE RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
ANTIDUMPING CASES
While the Antidumping Regulation does not provide for
judicial review of Council and Commission determinations, the
EEC Treaty grants certain private parties direct access to the
Court of Justice.55 Certain private parties may also indirectly
challenge a regulation in Member State courts. 56 Various hy-
52. Id. art. 14(1), at 14. After the Commission consults the Advisory Commit-
tee, the Commission determines whether review.is warranted. Id. art. 14(2), at 14. A
review of regulations imposing duties and decisions to accept undertakings may also
be initiated by the Commission or may be held at the request of a Member State. Id.
art. 14(1), at 14. The review procedures allow for a regulation to be amended, re-
pealed, or annulled. Id. art. 14(3), at 14.
53. Id. art. 16(1), at 15. Refunds shall be adjusted to reflect the changes that
have occurred in the dumping margin since the original investigation, based on ship-
ments from the importer's supplier. Id. Calculations are made in accordance with
the same method applied in the original investigation. Id.
The refund procedures require that an importer submit an application to the
Member State in the territory where the products were released for free circulation.
Id. art. 16(2), at 15. Further, the applicant must submit the application "within three
months of the date on which the amount of the definitive duties to be levied was duly
determined by the competent authorities or of the date on which a decision was made
definitively to collect the amounts secured by way of provisional duty." Id.
The Member State forwards the application either with or without an opinion on
the merits to the Commission. Id. The Member State should forward the application
to the Commission as soon as possible. Id.
The Commission informs the Member States of its opinion with regard to the
application. Id. A Member State must inform the Commission within one month if it
objects to the Commission's findings'. Id. Where there are no objections the Com-
mission will issue a decision in accordance with the opinion. Id. Where a Member
State objects, the Commission shall consult with the Advisory Committee as to
whether and to what extent the application should be granted. Id.
An importer may not use the refund procedure to allege that a particular ship-
ment had not caused injury but may allege only that dumping has been eliminated. J.
BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 235.
54. See Bellis, judicial Review of EEC Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Determinations
After FEDIOL The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 539,
540 (1984).
55. See infra notes 70-101 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 202-13. But see Temple Lang, Judicial Review of Trade Safeguard
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potheses have been asserted that might explain the intent of
the EEC drafters in limiting direct access of private parties to
the Court of Justice.57 One explanation is that if private par-
ties are denied access to the Court, these parties cannot dis-
turb the Community's carefully developed commercial poli-
cies. 58 In antidumping investigations, the Commission may ar-
Measures in the European Community, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 641, 683 (B.
Hawk ed. 1986) (national courts are not open to exporters and non-EEC producers).
57. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, for a discussion of various explanations for the
limited right of private parties to bring direct actions. Rasmussen explores the argu-
ment that the drafters of the EEC Treaty intended that a private right of action
should be restricted as evidenced by contrasting the language of Article 173 with that
of Article 33 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (the "ECSC
Treaty"), which provides a more liberal test for judicial review. Id. at 119. Article 33
of ECSC provides:
The Court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State or
by the Council to have decisions or recommendations of the High Authority
declared void on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essen-
tial procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. The Court may not,
however, examine the evaluation of the situation, resulting from economic
facts or circumstances, in the light of which the High Authority took its deci-
sions or made its recommendations, save where the High Authority is al-
leged to have misused its powers or to have manifestly failed to observe the
provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application.
Undertakings or . . . associations . . . may .... institute proceedings
against decisions or recommendations concerning them which are individ-
ual in character or against general decisions or recommendations which they
consider to involve a misuse of powers affecting them.
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
2 (Cmd. 5189) at 31 (official English version), 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 167 (unofficial Eng-
lish trans.).
58. See Producteurs de Fruits v. Council (Fruits and Vegetables), Joined Cases,
16 & 17/62, 1962 E.C.R. 471, 486, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005, at 7192 (opin-
ion of Mr. Advocate-General Lagrange). Lagrange notes that allowing individuals
affected by regulations, which are quasi-legislative in nature, greater participation in
the parliamentary branch of government is preferable to providing for annulment
actions because of the often extensive negotiations needed to forge a regulation and
because of the possible negative effects of a successful annulment action. Id.
The Antidumping Regulation, authorized by Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, pro-
vides for the development of a common commercial policy for the Community. EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 42-43, 298 U.N.T.S. at 60.
Article 113(1) provides:
1. After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to pro-
tect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.
Id. Article 113 grants the authority to develop this policy to the Commission and the
Council. Article 113(2) states that "[the Commission shall submit proposals to the
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gue that if disputes do arise, they are most likely not factual
disputes, but rather disputes as to inferences that the Commis-
sion, with its expertise, has drawn from the facts.59 Thus, it
may be argued that such expert determinations should remain
within the domain of the Commission and the Council and
should not be subject to judicial scrutiny.60
Council for implementing the common commercial policy." Id. Thus, it is argued
that antidumping regulations are legislative measures and not administrative deci-
sions. Consequently, private parties should be denied the opportunity to interfere
with Community policy-making. Stein & Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action in a Transnational and Federal Context, in EUROPEAN LAW AND THE INDI-
VIDUAL 113, 122-23 (F.G. Jacobs ed. 1976); see Harding, The Review of EEC Regulations
and Decisions, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 311, 312 (1982). Harding states:
[T]he regulation may be said to be "legislative" or "normative" in character
while the particular application of the decision connotes the idea of an ad-
ministrative act. Indeed, it is the "legislative" nature of the regulation
which mainly justifies the exclusion of its review at the instance of individu-
als. In the first place, since a regulation has a general application, an indi-
vidual is just one of an indeterminate number of persons affected by it, so
that his interest in its annulment would be proportionately small and uncer-
tain. Secondly, the annulment of a legislative act is potentially more disrup-
tive of established interests than that of an individual act and it may be rea-
soned that the private party's proportionately small interest in a general
measure does not justify his being able to set in motion the process which
may lead to its annulment.
Id.
Another aspect of concern to the Commission and the Council when developing
commercial policy is the conflicting nature of competition law and antidumping law.
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 3. Thus, the Commission and the Coun-
cil take into consideration the interest of competition law when considering an-
tidumping determinations. Decision on Glycine, Council Regulation No. 2322/85,
OJ. L 218/1 (1985); J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 38. See generally
Temple Lang, The Impact of the New Court of First Instance in EEC Antitrust and Trade
Cases, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 579, 603 (B. Hawk ed. 1988) (concerning
relationship between antitrust and antidumping law).
59. See E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 272 (noting that Community authorities
view antidumping regulations as part of Community's trade policy and argue that
Court's review of such measures should be limited, particularly because antidumping
law, like competition law, involves interpretation of facts).
60. See Stein & Vining, supra note 58, at 123. The authors note that attorneys for
the Commission and Counsel have consistently opposed admitting private parties.
Id. Although, in Allied Corporation v. Council, Case 53/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1640, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200, the second case involving the Allied Corporation,
the Council agreed that direct judicial review under Article 173, rather than proceed-
ings in the Member States courts had certain advantages from the standpoint of legal
protection. Id. at 1644, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200, at 16,212-13. The
Council asserted, however, that allowing exporters and producers to bring direct ac-
tions, but not independent importers, creates a second parallel remedy in the na-
tional courts. Id. Judicial review under Article 177 in the Member States' courts,
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Another theory that might explain the drafters' intent in-
volves concern for Member State sovereignty. Because "the
Community was created as a compact among sovereign
States, "61 whereby private citizens remain directly subject to
the laws of a Member State and not that of the Community, it
is argued that direct access to the Court was limited. 2 Private
individuals were considered to lack an international legal per-
sonality to enable a direct suit before the Court of Justice.63
It has also been argued that by restricting direct access,
the Court is able to further its goal of becoming a high court of
appeal rather than a court of first instance. 64 There are several
lower courts available to private parties, including the Member
States' national courts, administrative courts, and the newly-
created Court of First Instance.65 It is argued that once a
lower court has established the facts, the Court of Justice may
issue judgments more quickly by acting as a court of appeal.66
In its proposed plan for the new Court of First Instance, the
Court of Justice expressed concern for its increasing case
however, is inconvenient and unsatisfactory for the Commission and Council, as well
as private parties. Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 683.
61. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 117.
62. See Stein & Vining, supra note 58, at 116 ("Member States carry the bulk of
responsibility for implementing Community law.").
63. Id. at 113. The authors note that "[d]espite the dramatically increased em-
phasis upon international protection of basic human rights, individuals have been
given access to international dispute settlement machinery in only a few isolated in-
stances within the United Nations system, and on a regional level pursuant to the
European convention on human rights." Id.
64. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 114. Rasmussen asserts that the Court's re-
strictive interpretation of Article 173(2) is to further the Court's role as a high court
of appeal; an interest that outweighs a private party's direct access to the Court of
Justice. Id. at 122. Compare id. with Harding, The Private Interest in Challenging Commu-
nity Action, 5 EUR. L. REV. 354, 355 (1980) (Court may sustain use of restrictive policy
of judicial review to further its role as an appellate court, however, right of judicial
review by Court was originally structured so private parties may not challenge Com-
munity measures that are not of direct and individual concern).
65. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 122.
66. Id. at 126. Rasmussen notes that in a direct action before the Court, the
amount of time necessary to issue a ruling may take between 12 and 18 months,
whereas, under Article 177, a ruling may take only seven months. Id.
One explanation for the Court's delay in issuing rulings in direct proceedings
stems from the fact-finding procedures. Id. In direct proceedings, the record is com-
piled by way of pleadings. von Heydebrand und der Lasa, Confidential Information in
Antidumping Proceedings Before United States Courts and the European Court, 11 EUR. L. REV.
331, 344 (1986). Consequently, the Council and the Commission need not submit all
the information collected during an investigation to the Court. Id.
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load.6 7 In that proposal, the Court argued that jurisdiction
over cases challenging the Commission's or Council's acts or
failure to act in antidumping investigations should be granted
to the Court of First Instance. 68  However, the Council, which
has control over the jurisdictional grant to the Court of First
Instance, rejected this plan in July 1988.69
A. Private Parties and Article 173
The first way in which a private party may seek direct re-
view by the Court of Justice is under the second paragraph of
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty.7 In such actions, the Court
may annul acts of the Council or Commission other than opin-
ions or recommendations. 71 The bases for annulment include:
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the EEC Treaty, infringement of
any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of pow-
ers. 72 Article 173 limits the individuals who may initiate annul-
.67. H.L., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1987-88 Sess.,
FIFTH REPORT, A EUROPEAN COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 5 (1987) [hereinafter SELECT
COMMITTEE]. As the Committee report indicates:
This [workload] is more than the Court can handle satisfactorily. Conse-
quently, individual cases take longer to complete and an ever-increasing
number are pending at any given time. The primary objective of the Court[]
[ofJustice's] proposal [to create the Court of First Instance] is to lighten this
work-load, reduce the arrears and shorten the time taken to conclude cases.
Id. Between 1970 and 1986, the number of cases brought before the Court ofJustice
increased from 79 in 1970 to 329 in 1986; this figure includes staff cases, references
for preliminary rulings, and other direct actions. Id. at 32. The Court's measurable
increase in its work-load combined with the increasing complexity of the cases is pos-
sibly a sufficient reason to further the Court's role as a court of appeal. See Harding,
supra note 64, at 354-55. But see Mancini, Access to Justice: Individual Undertakings and
EEC Antitrust Law-Problems and Pitfalls, 12 FORDAM INT'L L.J. 189, 189-90 (1989)
(concerns for providing efficient system of legal protection and not overload of Court
of Justice is principle reason for establishment of Court of First Instance).
68. SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 67, at 10. The Court of First Instance will
not hear cases seeking to invalidate antidumping regulations. Id.
69. E.C. BULL. No. 7/8, at 108-09 (1988). However, the Council agreed to re-
examine the Court's proposal after the Court of First Instance had been operating
for two years. Id. at 109.
70. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 57, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75. The second paragraph of Article 173 provides: "Any natural or legal
person may ... institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed
to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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ment proceedings to natural or legal persons who fulfill the
following three-pronged admissibility test: the applicant must
demonstrate that (1) the regulation constitutes a decision that
is of (2) direct and (3) individual concern to it.73
In order to understand the application of Article 173 to
antidumping cases, it is beneficial to examine briefly the devel-
opment of this test in the case law of the Court of Justice.
1. Distinguishing a Decision from a Regulation
The first hurdle facing an applicant involves the "deci-
sion" requirement, which is illustrated by the 1962 case of
Producteurs de Fruits v. Council (Fruits and Vegetables). 74 In this
case, the applicant argued that the term "regulation" was in-
terchangeable with the term "decision" and, therefore, it did
not need to establish that the regulation was of direct and indi-
vidual concern as required by Article 173. 7' The Court re-
jected the applicant's contention, because Article 189 of the
EEC Treaty makes a clear distinction between a "decision" and
a "regulation," and it was, therefore, inconceivable that the
terms were interchangeable. 76 The Court noted that a regula-
tion, addressed to all Member States, has general application
to all individuals, whereas a decision is binding only upon
those to whom it is addressed, whether a Member State or a
private party.77 Thus, if the nature of a regulation is legisla-
tive, it has a general application to all Member States and may
not be challenged.78
In a 1975 case, the Court looked only to the second and
third prongs of the admissibility test-whether the challenged
act was of direct and individual concern.79 However in 1979,
73. Id.
74. Joined Cases 16 & 17/62, 1962 E.C.R. 471, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
8005.
75. Id. at 478, 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005, at 7185-86.
76. Id.
77. Id. 1 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8005, at 7186.
78. H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES § 406
(4th ed. 1987).
79. See CvA.M. v. Commission, Case 100/74, 1975 E.C.R. 1393, 1401-03, $$ 3-
20, Common Mkt. Rep.. (CCH) 1 8328, at 7843-44. In admitting this suit, the Court
stated:
Such a measure, even if it is one of a number of provisions having a legisla-
tive function, individually concerns the persons to whom it applies in that it
affects their legal position because of a factual situation which differentiates
697
698 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:682
the Court emphasized that a regulation does not constitute a
decision, because a regulation is a measure of general applica-
tion and not of individual concern to the applicants.8 0
2. Direct Concern
Once an applicant establishes that a regulation involves or
constitutes a decision, it is necessary to show that that decision
is of direct concern to it. A decision is of direct concern when
it leaves no latitude of discretion to the addressee of the deci-
sion and affects the applicant.8 ' In Toepfer v. Commission,82 for
example, the applicant challenged a Commission decision83
that did not require the Member State to make any subsequent
determinations in order for the measure to be implemented.84
In this instance, the Court found that the decision was of direct
concern to the applicant." Thus, an applicant is directly con-
them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually just as in
the case of the persons addressed.
Id. at 1403, 19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8328, at 7844; see also H. SCnERMERS,
supra note 78, § 405. The Court's decision gave
the impression that individuals can bring an action whenever they are able
to demonstrate that an act concerns them directly and individually, irrespec-
tive of the nature of the act. In the CAM Case . . . the Court took up the
questions of direct and individual concern, without previously considering
whether the act indeed was a decision. When it had established that there
was individual concern, it declared the case admissible, apparently implying
that in a case of individual concern the act must be a decision.
Id. § 405 (footnote omitted); see Dinnage, supra note 2, at 20.
80. See Wagner v. Commission, Case 162/78, 1979 E.C.R. 3467, 3487-88, 1 17-
22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8623, at 7381-93; H. SCHERMERS, supra note 78,
§ 406 (when regulation is clearly legislative in character, Court uses decision require-
ment as preliminary barrier question to question of whether it concerns applicant
directly and individually); Dinnage, supra note 2, at 20 (Court again began consider-
ing whether regulation was part of general regulatory scheme).
81. See Toepfer v. Commission, Joined Cases 106 & 107/63, 1965 E.C.R. 405,
410-11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8031, at 7460; H. SCHERMERS, supra note 78,
§ 422 ("Court of Justice interprets direct concern to mean that the addressee is left
no latitude of discretion, that is that the decision affects the applicant without the
addressee being necessitated to take any decision himself.").
82. 1965 E.C.R. at 405, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8031.
83. Id. at 410, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8031, at 7460. Although the con-
tested measure in this instance was a decision and not a regulation, the applicant
must still establish that the measure is of direct and individual concern. See EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I, at 57, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76.
84. Toepfer, 1965 E.C.R. at 411, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8031, at 7460.
The Commission's decision automatically replaced another measure that had been
directly applicable to the applicant. Id.
85. Id. The Court found that the Commission's decision was of direct concern
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cerned where the challenged act affects the applicant "without
the influence of other circumstances. '86
In contrast to Toepfer, the Court in Socigti des Usines de Beau-
port v. Council87 held that the Council's regulation addressed to
the Member State was not of direct concern to the applicant,
because the regulation did not take effect until the Member
State made certain determinations.88 These determinations
concerned whether or not to reduce certain quotas. 9 Thus,
the Council's regulation was not of direct concern to the appli-
cant, but rather the Member State's determinations with re-
spect to the quotas were of direct concern to the applicant. 90
3. Individual Concern
The final requirement is that the decision must be of indi-
vidual concern to the applicant. An applicant is individually
concerned with a decision that is addressed to another if the
"decision affects [the applicant] . . . by reason of certain attrib-
utes which are peculiar to [it]."'" For example, in Fruit Com-
to the applicant, because the decision had an immediate effect upon the applicant.
Id.
86. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 250.
87. Joined Cases 103 to 109/78, 1979 E.C.R. 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8531.
88. Id. at 25, 1 20-22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8531, at 7630-31.
89. Id. 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8531, at 7630-31.
90. Id. 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8531, at 7631.
91. Plaumann v. Commission, Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 107, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8013, at 7274. In Plaumann, the Court deemed an EEC importer not
individually concerned with a decision addressed to a Member State, whiqh denied
authorization for the partial suspension of custom duties on a certain product. Id. at
107-08, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8013, at 7274. The Court held:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to
be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which
they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors
distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed.
In the present case the applicant is affected by the disputed Decision as an
importer of clementines, that is to say, by reason of a commercial activity
which may at any time be practised by any person and is not therefore such
as to distinguish the applicant in relation to the contested Decision as in the
case of the addressee.
Id.
In a later action by exporters who had entered into contracts at a time prior to
the date of the contested regulation, the Court held that the exporters were individu-
ally concerned by a regulation that raised prices, because
[b]y adopting these distinguishing criteria the contested measure affects a
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pany v. Commission9 2 the Court held that a regulation affecting
the availability of import licenses was of individual concern to
parties who had already applied for the licenses, because the
content of the regulation was determined with respect to the
fixed number of applications that had been filed.93 In a more
recent case, Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission,94 the Court held that
a Commission decision providing for import restrictions was of
individual concern to certain Greek companies.95 These par-
ties had entered contracts prior to the adoption of the decision
and the contracts were to be carried out during the months in
which the decision applied. 96 Thus, the Court held that these
applicants were distinguished from all other firms concerned
by the decision, because their contractual obligations were im-
paired by the Commission decision.9 7
In a number of cases, the Court has stated what is not of
individual concern to an applicant. For example, an applicant
is not individually concerned by an act that merely affects its
business activity when such activity may be practiced by any
other person at any time.98 Nor will the Court find an action of
individual concern if the challenged decision is of a general
fixed number of traders identified by reason of the individual course of ac-
tion which they pursued or are regarded as having pursued during a particu-
lar period.
Such a measure, even if it is one of a number of provisions having a
legislative function, individually concerns the persons to whom it applies in
that it affects their legal position because of a factual situation which differ-
entiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually
just as in the case of the person addressed.
C.A.M. v. Commission, Case 100/74, 1975 E.C.R. 1393, 1403, 18-19, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8328, at 7844. For a detailed discussion on "individual concern,"
see H. SCHERMERS, supra note 83, §§ 408-21.
92. Joined Cases 41 to 44/70, 1971 E.C.R. 411, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8142.
93. Id. at 422, 16-22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8142, at 7628. The regu-
lation had been adopted with consideration of the state of the market during the time
period in question and with respect to the number of requested import licenses dur-
ing that time period. Id. 20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8142, at 7628.
94. Case 11/82, 1985 E.C.R. 227, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,159.
95. Id. at 240-44, $ 1-19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,159, at 15,934-36.
96. Id. at 244, 19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,159, at 15,936.
97. Id.
98. See Producteurs de Fruits v. Council (Fruits & Vegetables), Joined Cases 16
& 17/62, 1962 E.C.R. 471, 479, 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005, at 7186;
Dinnage, supra note 2, at 20 ("[Tihe act in question was intended to apply objectively
in this instance, for anyone who exercised, or who might exercise, the trade in ques-
tion was or would be affected by it.").
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economic scope, that is, a measure designed to affect the entire
Common Market and not solely the applicant. 99 In addition, a
decision addressed to another is not of direct and individual
concern to an applicant if the measure merely influences com-
petition in the applicant's line of business.' 00 Moreover, the
Court ofJustice has held that even a regulation using objective
legal or factual criteria, so that the number and the identities
of the persons to whom the regulation applies may possibly be
determined, does not constitute a decision of individual con-
cern. 1 1
In sum, in a direct action under Article 173, an applicant's
admissibility to the Court ofJustice to challenge an antidump-
ing regulation is contingent upon three factors. The applicant
must establish, first, that the regulation constitutes a binding
decision upon him; second, that the regulation directly affects
the applicant without the influence of other circumstances;
99. See Glucoseries R~unies v. Commission, Case 1/64, 1964 E.C.R. 413, 417,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8024, 7407. In Glucoseries, while the decision in ques-
tion was directed to all Member States, the applicant, a Belgian exporter, argued that
it was of concern individually because it was "the only Belgian undertaking with an
economic interest in the matter and both willing and able to export glucose from
Belgium to France in significant quantities during the period of validity of the con-
tested Decision." Id. The Court stated that, "[iun view of the general economic
scope of the contested Decision, it is not of individual concern to the applicant even
if the latter does occupy the position which it claims on the Belgian market in respect
of glucose exporters to France." Id. The Court noted that the entire Common Mar-
ket, not only the Belgian market was concerned by the regulation. Id.
100. See Eridania v. Commission, Joined Cases 10 & 18/68, 1969 E.C.R. 459,
481, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8099, at 8425-26. In Eridania, the Court held:
The mere fact that a measure may exercise an influence on the competitive
relationships existing on the market in question cannot suiffice to allow any
trader in any competitive. relationship whatever with the addressee of the
measure to be regarded as directly and individually concerned by that mea-
sure.
Only the existence of specific circumstances may enable a person sub-
ject to Community law and claiming that the measure affects his position on
the market to bring proceedings under Article 173.
Id.
101. Compagnie Frangaise Commerciale v. Commission, Case 64/69, 1970
E.C.R. 221, 226-27, 1 i, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8091, at 8323. In Compagnie
Fran~aise, the Court held that a regulation does not constitute a decision of individual
concern where the "number and even the identity of the persons to whom it applies
at a given moment may be determined m6re or less precisely, provided that it is clear
that this application depends on an objective legal or factual situation defined by the
measure with reference to its purpose." Id.; see Dinnage, supra note 2, at 20.
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third, that the regulation distinguishes the applicant from any
other person by reason of specific circumstances.
B. Antidumping Cases and Article 173
In antidumping cases, these three requirements have been
met by exporters, non-EEC producers, and the EEC subsidiar-
ies of both. °2 The entities need only establish that they were
identified in the regulation or were concerned by the prelimi-
nary investigation.'0 3 Furthermore, EEC producers have been
admitted where they have participated in the investigations, 104
and a Community association representing EEC producers has
been admitted in an antisubsidy case where the Court held that
the Antidumping Regulation implied a cause of action.'0 5
1. Exporters, Non-EEC Producers, and Their
EEC Subsidiaries
The first antidumping case to reach the Court under Arti-
cle 173 was NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council ("Ball Bear-
ings").'0 6 In this case, the applicants, four major non-EEC pro-
ducers and their affiliated EEC subsidiaries, sought partial an-
nulment of a regulation. 0 7 The applicants contested an article
of the regulation that provided for the definitive collection of
the amounts secured by way of a provisional antidumping
duty.' 0 Although the applicants agreed that the contested
portion of the regulation was drafted in abstract terms,'0 9 they
argued that it affected only the importers of products manufac-
102. See infra notes 106-41 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
106. Case 113/77, 1979 E.C.R. 1185, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574.
107. Id. at 1202, 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8340-4 1.
108. Id. at 1203, 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8341.
109. Article 3 of Council Regulation No. 1778/77, O.J. L 196/I (1977) provides
that
[t]he amounts secured by way of provisional duty under the provisions of
Regulation (EEC) No 261/77 extended by Regulation (EEC) No 944/77, in
respect of products manufactured and exported by the following producers,
shall be definitively collected to the extent that they do not exceed the rate
of duty fixed in this Regulation: Koyo Seiko Company Limited; Nachi
Fujikoshi Corporation; NTN Toyo Bearing Company Limited; Nippon Seiko
K.K.
Id. at 3.
1989] REVIEW OF ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS 703
tured by the four major non-EEC producers under investiga-
tion." 0 The article provided for the collection of amounts se-
cured by known enterprises that had been individually evalu-
ated by the Commission during the investigation."' Thus, the
applicants contended that the provision constituted a deci-
112sion.
The Council asserted that the identification of the Japa-
nese producers in the regulation did not alter the nature of the
measure.'' 3 The regulation remained a legislative measure as
an instrument of commercial policy and, thus, did not consti-
114tute a decision.'
The Court found that the regulation providing for the col-
lection of provisional duties only from the four major produ-
cers "constitutes accordingly a collective decision relating to
named addressees."'"' Thus, the regulation constituted a
binding decision with regard to the named entities and not a
measure with general application." 6 Because the amount of
the duties had been determined by inspecting the premises of
both the subsidiaries and the Japanese producers, the Court
found that the measure was of individual concern to these par-
ties.' '"
The Court held that the collection of a provisional duty is
per se of direct concern to any importer who has imported the
products in question." 8 In this instance, the importers were,
therefore, individually concerned, because the measure ap-
plied to only those importers that had imported products from
the four major Japanese producers in the past.'"' In addition,
the Court found the regulation to be of direct and individual
concern to the non-EEC producers, because these producers
110. Ball Bearings, 1979 E.C.R. at 1204, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574,
at 8341.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1193, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8574, at 8334.
114. Id. The Council asserted that while the non-EEC producers were named in
compliance with article 8(b) of the GATT Antidumping Code, the duty is payable by
all importers and thus the regulation is not of direct and individual concern to the
producer. Id.
115. Id. at 1205, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8342.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1204-05, 1 8-12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8341-42.
118. Id. at 1205, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8342.
119. Id. $ 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8342.
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were clearly related to the importers, who were their EEC sub-
sidiaries. 2 0
The Court rejected the Council's argument that the im-
porters were not directly concerned by the regulation but
rather by the collection of duties by the Member States.' 2'
The Court stated that such implementation is "purely auto-
matic and ... in pursuance not of intermediate national rules
but of Community rules alone."' t2 2 Thus, because the Member
States had no latitude of discretion, the importers were directly
concerned by the regulation imposing a duty. .' 2
3
Despite the apparent significance of this case, commenta-
tors have deemed the decision of limited precedential value,
because the Court stressed the extraordinary manner in which
the regulation was drafted, by specifically naming the four pro-
ducers. 124
Five years after Ball Bearings, the Court in Allied v. Commis-
sion,125 admitted an action by non-EEC producers and export-
ers seeking to annul a provisional antidumping regulation. '
2 6
As in Ball Bearings, the regulation specifically identified the in-
dividual parties. 127 The Court noted that non-EEC producers
120. Id. at 1204-05,. 9-12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8341-42.
The Court made this determination, because the Commission had treated the pro-
ducer and its EEC subsidiaries as one unit during the investigation, when calculating
the export price. See id. at 1204, 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8341-42.
The Antidumping Regulation provides that where there exists an association or com-
pensatory agreement between the exporter and the importer and it appears that the
export price is an unreliable guide, the Commission may construct the export price
on the basis of the price of re-sale to the first independent buyer. Antidumping Reg-
ulation, supra note 11, art. 2(8)(b), at 5.
121. Ball Bearings, 1979 E.C.R. at 1205, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9 8574,
at 8342.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SeeJ. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 248-49; E. VERMULST, supra
note 11, at 261; Bellis, supra note 54, at 544-45; Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 644;
see also supra note 109 (text of the contested portion of the regulation).
After Ball Beatings, in which the Community's procedures in antidumping investi-
gations were criticized, the Community amended the Antidumping Regulation. R.
DALE, ANTI-DuMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 98-99 (1980).
125. Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984 E.C.R. 1005, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,084.
126. Id. at 1030, $ 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,084, at 15,127.
127. Comm'n Regulation No. 2302/82, O.J. L 246/5 (1982).
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and exporters cannot go to Member States' courts." 8 Conse-
quently, these non-EEC entities would be denied an opportu-
nity for any judicial review if the Court were to hold their claim
inadmissible. 2 9 Thus, the Court and the Commission favored
admission to ensure reciprocity for Community producers and
exporters subject to antidumping duties in non-Member States
who might similarly be denied access to judicial review. 130
The Court in Allied further asserted that, while a regula-
tion may have a legislative character with regard to all traders
concerned, producers and exporters who were charged with
dumping may be directly and individually concerned if they
were identified in the regulation or were concerned by the pre-
liminary investigations. 13' The Court determined that the reg-
ulation was of direct and individual concern to these appli-
cants, non-EEC producers and exporters, because it was neces-
sary to identify them individually during the investigation in
order for the Commission to calculate the dumping margin. 3 2
Allied established a "broad approach" with regard to ad-
missibility of non-EEC producers and exporters. 3 3 These en-
tities need only establish that they were identified in the regu-
lation or that the Commission imposed a duty on the basis of
128. Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1029, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,084, at 15,126.
129. Id. 44 8-9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,126.
130. Id. at 1029-30, 44 9, 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,126-27;
see Kuyper, Some Reflections on the Legal Position of the Private Complainant in Various Proce-
dures Relating to Commercial Polic,, in LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION I 15, 125
(1983) (noting the concern that access to judicial review be available to non-Member
State parties so Community parties would have access to judicial review in antidump-
ing proceedings in non-Member States).
131. Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1030, $$ 12, 14, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,084, at 15,127. The original French version of 12 reads as follows: "II
apparalt ainsi que les actes portant institution de droits antidumping sont de nature i
concerner directement et individuellement celles des entreprises productrices et ex-
portatrices qui peuvent d6montrer qu'elles ont 6t6 identifi es dans les actes de la
Commission ou du Conseil ou concern es par les enqu tes pr~paratoires." Allied
Corporation v. Commission, Affaires jointes 239 et 275/82 (E.C.J. Feb. 21, 1984)
(LEXIS, Intnat library, CJCE file).
132. See Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1030, 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,084, at 15,127. The Court held that "anti-dumping duties may be im-
posed only on the basis of the findings resulting from investigations concerning the
production prices and export prices of undertakings which have been individually
identified." Id.
133. See Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 643-44.
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the entities' pricing information. 134 For example, three years
later, in Nachi Fujikoshi v. Council (Mini Ball Bearings),' 35 the
Court admitted an action for annulment by a non-EEC pro-
ducer. 36 The applicant challenged a regulation imposing de-
finitive duties. 3 7 The Court held, however, that because the
contested regulation imposed different antidumping duties on
a series of expressly-named manufacturers or exporters of the
dumped product, the applicant was individually concerned
only by the specific provision in which it was named and not by
the entire regulation. 1"8 Consequently, the Court declared the
action admissible only with respect to those specific provi-
sions.1 39 In a more recent case, Tokyo Electric v. Council (Electric
Typewriters), 141 the Court admitted-without reference to the
"Allied standard"-a Japanese producer and its EEC subsidiar-
ies that sought annulment of specific provisions of an an-
tidumping regulation under Article 173.14
2. EEC Producers and Associations
Community producers and trade associations represent-
ing such producers are another category of parties interested
in antidumping determinations. Unlike individuals, however,
trade associations at one point faced the additional hurdle of
establishing a legal personality. 142 The Court addressed this
issue in the 1962 Fruits and Vegetables decision. 43 In that case,
the Court denied an association that was representing EEC
producers status as a legal personality under Article 173.144
The Court rejected the argument that an association repre-
senting certain businessmen could be individually concerned
134. Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1030, 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,084, at 15,127.
135. Case 240/84, 1987 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,486.
136. Id.
137. Id. at Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,486, at 18,545.
138. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,486, at 18,558.
139. Id.
140. Joined Cases 260/85 & 106/86, 1988 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,512.
141. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,512, at 18,851.
142. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
143. Producteur de Fruit v. Council (Fruits & Vegetables), Joined Cases 16 &
17/62, 1962 E.C.R. 471, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005.
144. Id. at 479-80, 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005, at 7186-87.
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by a measure affecting the association's general interests. 4 5 In
1983, however, in Fediol v. Commission,'46 the Court revised its
reasoning and granted an association representing Community
producers legal status under Article 173.117 In that case, the
Commission reasoned that it would be illogical to interpret
narrowly the definition of a legal person under Article 173 with
respect to antisubsidy cases, because the Antidumping Regula-
tion provides that associations acting on behalf of Community
industry may lodge complaints.' 48
Nevertheless, the Commission still asserted that the action
was inadmissible under the decision prong of Article 173.'49
Fediol, which lodged the initial complaint, sought annulment
of a communication in which the Commission announced that
a proceeding would not be initiated. 5 ' The Commission ar-
gued that the communication was merely a means of informing
interested parties of the Commission's action, as required
under the Antidumping Regulation, but that such a measure
did not involve a decision."'
The Court rejected the Commission's argument. 52 It ad-
mitted the action and held that the applicant's rights, as de-
fined by the Antidumping Regulation, implied a cause of ac-
tion. 53 In addition, the Court held that the applicants should
145. Id. at 480, 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005, at 7187. The Court
noted that "[sluch a principle . . . would derogate from the system of the Treaty
which allows applications for annulment by private individuals only of decisions
which have been addressed to them, or of acts which affect them in a similar man-
ner." Id., Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8005, at 7186-87.
146. Case 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 14,013.
147. Id. at 2935-36, 44 28-33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 14,013, at 14,172-
73. The Court examined the rights of an association under the Antidumping Regula-
tion but did not discuss the requirement of legal personality. Id.
148. Id. at 2918, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,013, at 14,162-63; see An-
tidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 5(l), at 8 (association acting on behalf of a
Community industry may lodge complaint). Although Fediol was an antisubsidy case
and not antidumping, the procedures for an antisubsidy investigation are similar to
those in an antidumping case and are governed by the same regulation. J. BESELER &
A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 173.
149. Fediol, 1983 E.C.R. at 2931, 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013, at
14,171; see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
150. Fediol, 1983 E.C.R. at 2929, T 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013, at
14,170.
151. Id. at 2931, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 14,013, at 14,171.
152. Id. at 2934, 25, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013, at 14,172.
153. Id. The Court noted that the Antidumping Regulation
recognizes the existence of a legitimate interest on the part of Community
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be granted the right to submit any information that would aid
the Court in determining whether the Commission had ob-
served the procedural guarantees provided by the Antidump-
ing Regulation, erred in its assessment of the facts, failed to
consider relevant facts, or misused its power. 154
Two years later in Timex v. Council and Commission,' 55 the
Court admitted the action of an individual Community pro-
ducer.' 56 The applicant challenged a regulation imposing a
duty, because the duty was allegedly too low. 15 7 The Court
noted the applicant's dominant position in the EEC market,
that it was responsible for initiating the complaint, that it had
participated in the proceedings, 58 and that the amount of the
duty was determined with respect to the injury suffered by
Timex."5 Thus, the contested regulation constituted a deci-
sion of direct and individual concern to Timex. 60
The Court's decisions in Allied,. Fediol, and Timex would
suggest that the Article 173 admissibility test in antidumping
cases is contingent upon the procedures that lead to the con-
tested measure rather than the nature of the contested mea-
sure.'
6 1
3. Independent Importers
a. Direct Actions Contesting Regulations
Another category of private parties interested in an-
producers in the adoption of anti-subsidy measures and that it defines cer-
tain specific rights in their favour, namely the right to submit to the Com-
mission all evidence which they consider appropriate, the right to see all
information obtained by the Commission subject to certain exceptions, the
right to be heard at the request and to have the opportunity of meeting the
other parties concerned in the same proceeding, and finally the right to be
informed if the Commission decides not to pursue a complaint.
Id.
154. Id. at 2935, 30, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,013, at 14,173.
155. Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R. 849, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143.
156. Id. at 866, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,782.
157. Id. at 864, 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,781.
158. Id. at 865-66, 14-15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,781-82.
159. Id. at 866, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,782.
160. Id. 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,782.
161. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 265; Bellis, supra note 54, at 549; Temple
Lang, supra note 56, at 647, 654-55 (Complainants seem to have standing on the
basis of "procedural rights given... [by the Antidumping Regulation] and not on the
legal nature of the regulation imposing the duty or the legal effects it produces for
the complainants." (emphasis in original)).
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tidumping regulations is the independent importer. The
Court has admitted an independent importer as an applicant in
only one instance, I.S.O. v. Council 162 -a companion case to the
Court's 1979 Ball Bearings decision. 63 In I.S.O., the independ-
ent importer imported exclusively from one of the four major
non-EEC producers charged with dumping. 64 The Court's
language in LS.O. was similar to that used in Ball Bearings,
where the Court determined that all three prongs of the Article
173 admissibility test had been satisfied with regard to the pro-
vision for the collection of provisional duties. 6 5
The contested regulation in LS.O. contained two other ar-
ticles that imposed a definitive duty and regulated the monitor-
ing of undertakings.' 66 The Court reasoned that, because
these articles were of direct and individual concern to the pro-
ducer who supplied I.S.O. and the producer and I.S.O. were
sufficiently closely associated, that similarly, these provisions
constituted decisions of direct and individual concern to
I.S.O. 167
In subsequent cases, however, the Court has not admitted
independent importers as applicants. For example, in Alusuisse
v. Council and Commission,'68 a 1982 case, an independent im-
porter challenged both a provisional and a definitive an-
tidumping duty.' 69 The applicant asserted that the action
should be admitted for two reasons.' 7 ° First, the importer ar-
gued that the contested regulations constituted decisions, be-
cause the importers formed a closed category of traders of a
limited number, whose identities were known at the time the
regulations were adopted. 17 In rejecting the independent im-
porter's claim, the Court reaffirmed that a regulation that uses
162. Case 118/77, 1979 E.C.R. 1277, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8575.
163. NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council (Ball Bearings), Case 113/77,
1979 E.C.R. 1185, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8574.
164. I.S.O. v. Council, 1979 E.C.R. 1291, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8575, at 8403.
165. Id. at 1292, 1294, 14 13-14, 25-27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8575, at
8403-04; see supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
166. LS.O., 1979 E.C.R. at 1292, 1 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8575, at
8404.
167. Id. at 1292-93, 14 15-23, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4 8575, at 8403-04.
168. Case 307/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3463, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869.
169. Id. at 3470, 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8242.
170. Id. at 3472-73, 10, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8243-44.
171. Id. at 3472, 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8243.
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objective legal or factual criteria related to the regulation's
purpose, although it is possible to identify parties to whom it
applies, remains a measure of general, application and is not a
decision of individual concern. 17 2
Second, the applicant argued that the procedures in the
Antidumping Regulation allowing for the participation of in-
terested parties suggest that any regulation, subsequently
adopted, constitutes an individual administrative measure that
a private party may contest. 173 The Court rejected this argu-
ment as well. 174 It held that the distinction between a decision
and a regulation is based on the nature of the measure and its
legal effect, not on the procedures for its adoption. 175 The
Court further noted that the importers were not without a rem-
edy, but could contest a Member State's collection of an-
tidumping duties in a national court. 17 1
Although in Allied, the Court subsequently liberalized the
admission standard with regard to non-EEC entities, 177 the
Court did not admit an action by an independent importer in
that case. ' 78 The Court found that the regulation could be of
individual concern to the non-EEC exporter either because the
measure identified the exporter or because the exporter was
172. Id. at 3472-73, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8243. The
Court held that
a measure does not cease to be a regulation because it is possible to deter-
mine the number or even the identity of the persons to whom it applies at
any given time as long as it is established that such application takes effect
by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in
relation to its purpose.
Id.; see Compagnie Frangaise Commerciale v. Commission, Case 64/69, 1970 E.C.R.
221, 226-27, I1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8091, at 8323. A regulation does not
constitute a decision of individual concern where the number and even the identity of
the persons to whom it applies at a given moment may be determined more or less
precisely, provided that the measure defines the purpose of the objective legal or
factual criteria used. Id.
173. Alusuisse, 1982 E.C.R. at 3473, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at
8243-44.
174. Id. 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8244.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Allied Corporation v. Commission, Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1005, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084;J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra
note 10, at 250.
178. Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1031, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,084, at 15,127.
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concerned by the preliminary investigation. 7 9 The independ-
ent importer, however, failed to satisfy these requirements.' 8"
The Court held that the regulation did not constitute a deci-
sion with regard to the independent importer, because the im-
porter was not referred to in any of the measures.' 8 ' The im-
porter was, thus, only within the objective scope of the regula-
tion.' 82 Furthermore, the Court found that the importer was
not concerned by the preliminary investigation. 83 Although
the importer acted as an importing agent for one of the export-
ers that was admitted, the Court still refused admission to the
importer. 8 4
The Court distinguished Allied from Ball Bearings by ob-
serving that in Ball Bearings, the Commission established the
dumping margin by reference to the retail price charged by the
importer and not by reference to the non-EEC producers'
price, as in Allied.' 8 5 Moreover, in contrast to Ball Bearings, the
Court advised the importer in Allied that the national courts
were available to challenge the collection of duties. 86
Unlike in Fediol and Timex, the Court has not determined
the admissibility of an importer with regard to procedural
rights found in the Antidumping Regulation. Instead, the
Court has determined admissibility based on whether the
Commission determined the dumping margin by reference to
the importer's pricing information.
b. Other Actions Involving Importers Before the Court of Justice
Since I.S.O., the Court has not admitted an independent
importer as an applicant, although it recently allowed one in-
dependent importer to intervene on behalf of the non-EEC
producer and its EEC subsidiaries.' 87 In Tokyo Electric Co. v.
Council (Electric Typewriter),'88 the independent importer was a
179. Id. at 1030, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,127.
180. Id. at 1031, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,127.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Tokyo Electric Co. v. Council (Electric Typewriters), Joined Cases
260/85 & 106/86, 1988 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,512, at 18,851.
188. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,512, at 18,832.
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Community manufacturer who resold the electric typewriters
under its own brand name.' 89 Under the rules of the Court,
interested parties may intervene in cases before the Court if
they have an interest in the result of the case.'9 0 In an applica-
tion seeking admission to the Court as an intervener, the in-
dependent importer can only make arguments supporting the
submissions of a party already admitted.' 9 ' The intervener
may not assert new arguments.' 92
In a February 1987 decision, Continentale Produkten Gesell-
schaft Ehrhardt-Renken v. Commission, 9 ' the Court admitted a di-
rect action by an independent importer who challenged a
Commission decision denying in part an application for the re-
fund of antidumping duties paid by the importer. 94 Although
the Commission had granted a refund of DM1638.01, the im-
porter sought the award of an additional DM675,144.5 plus
nine-percent interest from the date the application for the re-
fund was submitted. 95 The importer challenged the accuracy
of the normal values established by the Commission and
sought to replace those values with different normal values
that would revise the dumping margin and consequently affect
the amount of the refund. 96 The applicant also contended
189. Id. at -_, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,512, at 18,851.
190. Pl-otocol on the Statute of the Court ofJustice of the European Economic
Community, Apr. 17, 1957, art. 37, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) at 141,
148, 298 U.N.T.S. 147, 154 [hereinafter Statute of the Court]. Article 37 provides:
Member States and institutions of the Community may intervene in cases
before the Court.
The same right shall be open to any other person establishing an inter-
est in the result of any case submitted to the Court, save in cases between
Member States, between institutions of the Community or between Member
States and institutions of the Community.
Submissions made in an application to intervene shall be limited to sup-
porting the submissions of one of the parties.
Id. In Ball Bearings, the Federation of European Bearing Manufacturers Association
was granted leave to intervene. NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council (Ball Bear-
ings), Case 113/77, 1979 E.C.R. 1185, 1202, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8574,
at 8341-42.
191. Statute of the Court, supra note 190, art. 37, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at
148, 298 U.N.T.S. at 154.
192. Id.
193. Case 312/84, 1987 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH). .14,447.
194. Id. at , Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at 18,183-84.
195. Id. at , Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at 18,181. The refund ap-
plication was submitted in March 1982. Id.
196. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at 18,182.
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that the Commission's decision, denying the additional refund,
failed to state adequate reasons for its determination that the
importer did not prove that the normal value was lower. 197
The Commission countered that the importer was challenging
the legality of the original regulation procedure, which re-
sulted in the establishment of the dumping margin and the im-
position of the duty, and that such a challenge was inadmissi-
ble under the refund procedures.' 98
The Court considered the scope of the refund procedures
and held that while the importer may not challenge the validity
of the regulation imposing the duties, the importer may prove
that the regulation does not apply in this particular applicant's
case either because the importer purchased the goods at prices
approaching or equal to the normal value or where the particu-
lar supplier did not dump the goods but was able to sell below
the normal value and still make a profit because of low produc-
tion costs.' 99 After reviewing the statement of reasons, how-
ever, the Court rejected the importer's submission that the
Commission had improperly refused to consider the new infor-
mation submitted and held that the statement was adequate. 0 0
The Court then dismissed the importer's action.20 '
C. Article 177 Proceedings
An alternative procedure by which a private party may
reach the Court of Justice is through a proceeding under Arti-
cle 177 of the EEC Treaty. 20 2 In Allied and Alusuisse, the Court
of Justice suggested that independent importers use this pro-
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at 18,183.
200. Id. at ._, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at.18,184.
201. Id.
202. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 58, 298
U.N.T.S. at 76-77. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
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cedure.2 0 3  Under this procedure, private parties may chal-
lenge the collection of antidumping duties in Member State
courts. °4 Where the collection of duties is challenged, a ques-
tion of Community law would arise.2 °5 Under Article 177 a
Member State court may then seek a preliminary ruling from
the Court of Justice concerning the interpretation of the EEC
Treaty and the validity and interpretation of acts of the institu-
tions of the Community.20 National courts may not annul the
regulation but may instead treat the regulation as inapplica-
ble.20 7 Further, such decisions are not binding in other Mem-
ber States.20 8
In contrast to an action under Article 173, a request for a
preliminary ruling is considered a nonadversary proceeding.
209
The Court ofJustice, however, must invite all parties involved
in the national court litigation, all Member States, and the
Commission to submit written observations.2" 0 The Court
must also invite the Council to submit a statement where the
validity or interpretation of the act in dispute originates with
the Council.21  The Council's right to defend the validity of
the act is not as extensive, however, as that provided for in
annulment actions under Article 173.2 1 In Article 177 pro-
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before
the Court ofJustice.
Id.
203. See Allied Corporation v. Commission, Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1005, 1031, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,127; Alusuisse v.
Council & Commission, Case 307/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3463, 3473, 13, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8869, at 8244.
204. Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1031, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,084, at 15,127; Alusjisse, 1982 E.C.R. at 3473, 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8869, at 8244; Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 682.
205. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 268.
206. See supra note 202. The national court must submit a question if no judicial
remedies are available under national law against a decision of a national court. Id.
207. Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 682.
208. Id. at 683.
209. Bebr, supra note 3,-at 1235.
210. Statute of the Court, supra note 190, art. 20, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at
145-46, 298 U.N.T.S. at 152.
211. Id.
212. Bebr, supra note 3, at 1236.
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ceedings, the parties submit only one set of written observa-
tions and there is only one hearing at which a party may reply
to statements made by others.21
III. A NEW ADMISSIBILITY TEST
While the Community importer pays the levied duty, it is
precluded from direct access to the Court ofJustice, unlike ex-
porters and non-EEC producers. Even Community producers
have direct access to the Court ofJustice to challenge an alleg-
edly too low duty. 2 4 The independent Community importer
must, however, participate as merely an intervener, proceed
through Member State courts under Article 177, apply for re-
funds of amounts already paid, or wait one year to allege
changed circumstances. As the Community increasingly im-
poses antidumping duties in lieu of accepting price undertak-
ings, 2 15 the Court should reevaluate whether independent im-
213. K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
55 (1984). In a direct action, however, there are additional phases. First, the proce-
dures provide for two sets of written submissions that allow for reply briefs; second,
the Court makes inquiries to determine the facts; third, there is a hearing at which
parties may again reply to each others statements and at which the Advocate-Gen-
eral's opinion is delivered; and finally, thejudgment is issued by the Court. Id. at 29-
46.
214. See Timex v. Council and Commission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R. 849,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143.
215. See Council Regulation No. 1058/86 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Certain Electronic Scales Originating in Japan, O.J. L 97/1
(1986); Council Regulation No. 2322/85 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty
on Imports of Glycine Originating in Japan, O.J. L 218/1 (1985); Council Regulation
No. 1877/85 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Hy-
draulic Excavators Originating in Japan, O.J. L 176/1 (1985); Council Regulation No.
2089/84 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports of Certain Ball Bear-
ings Originating in Japan and Singapore, OJ. L 193/1 (1984); see also Bourgeois,
supra note 44, at 586 (noting the increasing number of investigations that result in
imposition of duties rather than price undertakings); Le Li~vre & Houben, EC Versus
Japan. The Community's Legal Weapons, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 427, 439 (1987) (not-
ing Commission's recent refusal to accept price undertakings from Japanese export-
ers); cf. Hindley, supra note 44, at 447 (concluding that EEC antidumping methodol-
ogy is biased against exporters and that Community's method of calculating dumping
margins tends to over-estimate the amount and may find dumping where none ex-
ists). But see Comm'n Decision 87/135 Accepting an Undertaking Given by Kyocera
Corporation in Connection with the Anti-Dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports
of Plain Paper Photo Copiers Originating in Japan and Terminating the Investiga-
tion, OJ. L 54/36 (1987); Comm'n Decision 87/210 Accepting Undertakings Given
in Connection with the Anti-Dumping Proceeding Concerning Imports of Outboard
Motors Originating in Japan and Terminating the Investigation, O.J. L 82/36 (1987).
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porters should be admitted in direct actions to challenge an-
tidumping regulations.
A. Concern for Equal Treatment
In Allied and Alusuisse, the Court advised the independent
importer to seek relief in the national court system under Arti-
cle 177 proceedings,2 1 6 a route not open to non-EEC produ-
cers and exporters because they do not pay a duty. z1 7 The
Commission has argued that furnishing independent import-
ers a second opportunity for judicial review under Article 173
would be unnecessary.21 8 It may be argued that at a time
when the Court of Justice is seeking to relieve itself of a bur-
densome caseload, as evidenced by the creation of the Court of
First Instance, it is senseless to allow now the admission of ap-
plicants who have an adequate forum available through pro-
ceedings in Member State courts. 21 9
Article 177 proceedings, however, are not a reasonable al-
ternative for the independent importer wishing to challenge an
antidumping regulation. 220 The drawbacks of Article 177 ac-
tions are overwhelming. An action under Article 177 may re-
quire proceedings before, first, the national court and then
later the Court of Justice.2 2' Moreover, there is no guarantee
that an importer will be able to proceed to the Court ofJustice.
It is solely the national court that determines whether there
exists a question to refer to the Court of Justice.2 22 If a na-
tional court in one Member State finds a regulation unlawful,
without referring a question to the Court of Justice, the ruling
216. See supra note 202-03 and accompanying text.
217. Allied Corporation v. Commission, Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1005, 1028-29, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,126. No cause
of action is created until the goods are imported and a duty collected. Id. Thus, only
importers who bring the goods into a Member State may bring an action in the na-
tional courts. Id.
218. Id. at 1013, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,115 (Commission
argued that importers may challenge application of regulation in national courts).
219. See Harding, supra note 64, at 354-55; supra note 67, and accompanying
text.
220. See Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 663, 682 (characterizing Article 177 pro-
ceedings as less satisfactory than direct proceedings).
221. See Bellis, supra note 54, at 540 (characterizing process as the "long march"
through the Member State courts).
222. See supra note 202-06 and accompanying text; Harding, supra note 58, at
312; Harding, supra note 64, at 357; Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 682-83.
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is not binding in other Member States.2 2 3 Thus, importers
conducting business in more than one Member State may be
faced with the possibility of court proceedings in more than
one Member State.
In proceedings before the national court, the importer is
confronted by a forum that lacks the expertise in Community
law and the resources to verify and review determinations.224
Where the Council or the Commission do not intervene in the
proceedings, the importer's opportunity to discover relevant
documents may be limited, because the defendants in the pro-
ceeding are the national custom authorities and not the Coun-
cil or the Commission. 22 5
The procedures used by the Court of Justice when a ques-
tion is referred to it may also be problematic in antidumping
cases.2 26 These procedures provide for only one written docu-
ment and one oral plea to contest opposing arguments.2 27
This limited opportunity to argue may be insufficient where
the subject matter is complex and linguistic differences may
hamper understanding. 228 Furthermore, because the Court re-
sponds with an abstract ruling and conducts no fact finding, 229
the independent importer must rely on the findings of fact
made by the Member State court.23 0 Again, this may be troub-
lesome for an importer where a Member State court may lack
223. Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 683.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 682.
226. Bellis, supra note 54, at 540; Harding, supra note 64, at 357.
227. ARTICLE 177 EEC: EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS 24 (H. Schermers, C. Tim-
mermans, A. Kellermann &J. Watson ed. 1987). Commentators have expressed the
need for adding a second round of proceedings in which participants could reply to
arguments. Id.
228. Harding, supra note 64, at 357; see Bellis, supra note 54, at 540 (Article 177
procedures are less suited to review of factual determinations than direct action
under Article 173).
There is also an irrebuttable presumption of law that all institutions of the Com-
munity are "cognisant of all the official Community languages." K.P.E. LASOK, supra
note 213, at 29. Lasok explains that as a result, a party may not assert that a fair trial
has been denied where evidence is in a language different than that of the case. Id.
229. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 116. But see, ARTICLE 177 EEC: EXPERIENCES
AND PROBLEMS, supra note 227, at 17 (noting that preliminary rulings are no longer
abstract and that Court must consider facts and details).
230. But see ARTICLE 177 EEC: EXPERIENCE AND PROBLEMS, supra note 227, at 62.
According to the president of the Fianzgericht, Hamburg, a party is not bound by the
national court's statement of the facts in cases where the validity of a Community act
is contested. Id. However, the contributors to the book "generally agreed that the
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expertise in this complex area of law.23'
Furthermore, forcing the importer to wait for the states to
implement the regulations, collect the duties, and then initiate
an action under Article 177 may involve a delay that frustrates
business planning.23 2 Such delay is needless when the content
of a regulation is known and the states are provided no discre-
tion as to its implementation. Because of the uncertainty and
cost confronting an independent importer, Article 177 is an
inadequate alternative to a direct action before the Court of
Justice 2 3 3 and may even discourage importers from beginning
national court proceedings.234
Although the Court of First Instance may have been an
ideal forum for the review of the complex matters in antidump-
ing cases, the Council rejected the Court's proposal to grant
the Court of First Instance jurisdiction over this area.2 35 Be-
cause the Court of Justice will maintain exclusive jurisdiction
over antidumping cases and yet lighten its docket by relin-
quishing jurisdiction over other matters, the Court should be
inclined to admit actions by independent importers. In light of
the Court ofJustice's willingness and ability to review complex
economic matters in other areas, 3 6 the Court should not hesi-
tate to admit actions by importers.
Just as Article 177 proceedings are an inadequate alterna-
responsibility for determining the facts rests primarily with the national court." Id. at
18.
231. See E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 269; Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 683.
232. Stein & Vining, supra note 58, at 123.
233. Harding, supra note 64, at 357.
234. Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 683.
235. See supra note 69. The Council did agree, however, to reconsider whether
the Court of.First Instance should be granted jurisdiction over antidumping cases
after the new court has been in operation for two years. Id.
With regard to antitrust actions, Mancini notes that with the establishment of the
Court of First Instance, not only businessmen, but also consumers will initiate actions
to assert their right to purchase goods at optimal market conditions. See Mancini,
supra note 67, at 191.
Vermulst believes that while the Court ofJustice is overqualified to handle direct
actions challenging antidumping cases, it has established a satisfactory "system of
judicial review" for all parties except independent importers. See E. VERMULST, supra
note 11, at 333. Vermulst, however, favors the establishment of an appeals commit-
tee from which appeals could be made to the Court of Justice. Id.
236. See Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8435 (concerning competition law); see Dinnage, supra note 2, at 15
(noting Court of Justice willingness to consider substantively complex cases).
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tive for the Community importer, so too are the administrative
review procedures. Under the Antidumping Regulation, an in-
terested party must wait at least one year after the conclusion
of the investigation before requesting administrative review.23 7
Furthermore, the party must submit evidence of changed cir-
cumstances sufficient to justify a review2 38 This procedure,
however, does not allow the importer to contest the legality of
the original regulation. 39
Similarly, refund procedures provide no alternative to im-
porters wishing to contest the legality of a regulation imposing
an antidumping duty. 240 The refund procedures merely allow
an importer to apply for reimbursement for excess duties al-
ready paid.24' In addition, the refund procedures may be
time-consuming and Costly. 24 2 An importer must submit an
application for a refund to the Member State, who must then
forward the application, with or without an opinion as to the
merits, to the Commission,24 3 and then the importer must sub-
mit an application in each Member State in which the duty was
paid, on a per shipment basis. 44 While an importer may bring
a direct action before the Court challenging a Commission de-
cision with regard to the amount of a refund, such action does
not allow the importer to challenge the methodology used to
calculate the dumping margin.245
B. Review of Council and Commission Determinations
While the Court does not want to open its doors to addi-
237. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 14(1), at 14. Originally, the
Community allowed a party to request a review at any time, however, the Community
found that this practice was abused. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 237.
Parties would abstain from cooperation with the investigation, and once a duty was
imposed, immediately request a review. Id.
238. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 14(1), at 14.
239. See Continentale Produkten v. Commission, Case 312/84, 1987 E.C.R. -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at 18,183.
240. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 254.
241. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 16(2), at 15; E. VERMULST,
supra note 11, at 254.
242. E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 254.
243. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 16(2), at 15; E. VERMULST,
supra note 11, at 254.
244. Antidumping Regulation, supra note I1, art. 16, at 15; E. VERMULST, supra
note 11, at 252-53.
245. See Continentale Produkten v. Commission, Case 312/84, 1987 E.C.R. -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,447, at 18,183.
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tional applicants, it seems unfair to restrict an independent im-
porter's access to judicial review in antidumping cases. The
Court already grants independent importers the right to inter-
vene,246 bring indirect actions under Article 177,247 and the
Antidumping Regulation arguably provides procedural guar-
antees that imply a direct cause of action.248 This Note argues
that the Court may admit independent importers in antidump-
ing actions under Article 173 without creating new causes of
action for other parties, which would be in violation of the EEC
Treaty.
One explanation for the Court's hesitancy in admitting in-
dependent importers in antidumping cases under Article 173
stems from concerns that the Court would have to accept any
case in which a party claims an interest in a regulation, not only
in antidumping cases. 24 9 Such a revision in the Court's prac-
tice would be a violation of the language of Article 173, which
expressly limits the right of private parties to initiate actions
before the Court.25 °
However, just as exporters, non-EEC producers, EEC pro-
ducers, and Community associations have been granted direct
judicial review, so too should independent importers. The
Court may provide judicial review without opening itself to a
deluge of other cases by applying the same standard used in
Fediol and Timex.2 1' The Court should thus consider whether
the Antidumping Regulation provides procedural guarantees
to importers. As in Fediol, the Court could find that there ex-
ists an implied right of action for the importer as to whether
those guarantees had been observed. While the Court appar-
ently rejected this approach in Alusuisse, where it held that the
distinction between a decision and a regulation is based on the
nature of the measure and its legal effect, not on the proce-
dures for its adoption, 252 that 1982 decision pre-dated the
1983 Fediol and 1985 Timex decisions.
246. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 251-63 and accompanying text.
249. See Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 663.
250. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text; Harding, supra note 64, at
357.
251. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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This Note asserts that the Antidumping Regulation does
provide procedural guarantees to independent importers, who
may be more than just interested parties. Those importers
who participate in the proceedings are guaranteed that the
Community and Council will take into consideration relevant
information. The Antidumping Regulation provides that im-
porters may submit relevant information 253 and that importers'
records may be verified254 and premises inspected.255 An im-
porter may also be provided notice of proposed measures 256
and the opportunity to inspect all information. 257 Further-
more, an importer may request both a hearing 258 and the op-
portunity to meet with other parties directly concerned.25 9
Significantly, the importer pays or posts any duty required in
accordance with a regulation as the goods enter the Commu-
nity for free circulation. 260  This obligation to pay the duty
combined with an importer's right to participate in the investi-
gation, and the Antidumping Regulation's "lesser duty" rule
(under which the duty imposed should be less than the dump-
ing margin if such an amount would be adequate to remove
the injury),261 logically establishes an importer's direct and in-
dividual concern in a regulation imposing an antidumping
duty.
Ultimately, if the rationale for antidumping laws is to pe-
nalize unfair trade practices, these laws are not effectively used
where unfounded injury determinations are made or excessive
duties are levied. 2 62 Community industries may be overpro-
253. Antidumping Regulation, supra note 11, art. 7(l)(a), at 9.
254. Id. art. 7(2)(a), at 9.
255. Id. art. 7(3)(a), at 9.
256. Id. art. 7(4)(b), at 9.
257. Id. art. 7(4)(a), at 9.
258. Id. art. 7(5), at 10.
259. Id. art. 7(6), at 10.
260. Id. arts. 11(1), 13(4), at 11-12.
261. The second Allied Corporation v. Council decision, Case 53/83, 1985
E.C.R. 1640, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200, confirmed that the Council is obli-
gated to limit the level of duties it imposes pursuant to the "lesser duty" rule. Id. at
1659, 17-19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200, at 16,222; see supra note 36 and
accompanying text on the "lesser duty" rule.
262. See Davey, An Analysis of European Cominunities Legislation and Practice Relating
to Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 39, 127 (B.
Hawk ed. 1984) ("protection is really provided to weak industries, or perhaps indus-
tries seeking protection from the rigors of competition"); see also R. DALE, supra note
124, at 11. Dale notes that the "objective of anti-dumping action ... must be to
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tected in the marketplace, while exporters and Community im-
porters are excessively penalized.2 63
Another explanation for the limited opportunity that Arti-
cle 173 provides to private parties to initiate judicial review is
the concern for the challenges to general Community policy
schemes.2 6 4 Where an applicant's interest in a regulation is
limited, that is, where an applicant fails to establish that a regu-
lation does in fact constitute a decision of direct and individual
concern, the Court should not review the contested regula-
tion.265 The regulation is considered a policy choice, made by
the Commission and Council, to which the Court of Justice
should defer.266
It is also submitted that concern for the effectiveness of
regulations that implement Community policy is evidenced by
identify temporarily low import prices . . . -a task involving subtle economic predic-
tion which one might reasonably suppose to be well beyond the capacity of econo-
mists, let alone of lawyers or civil-servants." Id. Dale also notes that antidumping
laws are promoted by politically active business groups, whereas consumers are rela-
tively inactive. Id. at 34.
263. See E. VERMULST, supra note 11, at 229; R. DALE, supra note 124, at xiii (pen-
alties imposed on importers discourage both dumped and undumped imports).
264. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 121 (opponents of Community measure
would abuse free access to judicial review by initiating actions under the belief that as
long as the validity of the contested measure is subject to litigation, enforcement
would be frustrated).
Rasmussen characterizes the Court's interpretation of Article 173 as restrictive
and contends that respect for the intent of the EEC Treaty drafters fails to support
maintaining a restrictive interpretation. Id. Not only is it difficult to accurately inter-
pret the founders' intent with respect to Article 173 in the absence of a legislative
history of the negotiations of the Treaties, id.; Weiler, The Court of Justice on Tial, 24
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 555, 575 (1987), but according to Rasmussen, it is also highly
unlikely that the drafters of the EEC Treaty meant to severely restrict a private
party's access to the Court ofJustice. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 119-20. Ras-
mussen asserts that because the drafters granted the Community broader powers
under the EEC Treaty than under the ECSC Treaty, it would be odd if the drafters
intended to provide less protection to private parties. See id. Rasmussen further ar-
gues that if democratic controls had been simultaneously institutionalized at the
Community level, a restrictive interpretation of Article 173 might be more logical.
Id.
265. Harding, supra note 64, at 356.
266. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 114. Originally, the Commission was to have
sole responsibility for the imposition of antidumping regulations. J. BESELER & A.
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 173-74. Several of the Member States were reluctant,
however, to relinquish all involvement. Id. Consequently, the Antidumping Code
provides that both the Commission and the Council participate in the proceedings.
Id. With the participation of the Council, a regulation is not just administrative but
also legislative in nature. Id.
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the structure of Article 177.267 If a private party does success-
fully challenge a regulation, the regulation is invalidated with
respect to future transactions, so that prior transactions are
not disrupted.2 68 However, it is not clear whether a judgment
of invalidity under Article 177 has only a prospective effect.26 9
If, however, a judgment of invalidity is retroactive and an im-
porter is refunded duties paid, it would seem that this proce-
dure would be adequate. But, as one writer notes, it is possibly
less disruptive to general Community policy schemes if a regu-
lation is quickly annulled in a direct action under Article 173,
rather than if Member States apply the regulation, with the
possibility that the Court of Justice eventually deems the mea-
sure invalid under Article 177.27°
C. Applying a New Admissibility Test
Under the current three-pronged admissability test, one
legal advisor to the Commission has suggested that the Court
ofJustice might admit importers who have concluded contracts
before antidumping duties are imposed. 27 1 Thus, an importer
could argue that a regulation for the definitive collection of
provisional duties constitutes a decision of direct and individ-
ual concern where the Commission was in a position to know
that the interests of a group were particularly and exclusively
affected by a specific provision of a regulation.272 This legal
267. Harding, supra note 64, at 358.
268. Id.
269. Bebr, supra note 3, at 1239.
270. Id. at 1248-49. Bebr notes that the Court's recent jurisprudence concern-
ing the effect of a ruling of invalidity in Article 177 is welcomed and has increased the
importance of this form of indirect judicial review. See id. at 1248. He notes that
indirect judicial review under Article 177 initiated by private parties has surpassed in
importance direct review under Article 173 and that it is only because of Article 177
that the validity of certain acts are reviewed at all. See id.
271. See Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 658.
272. See id. at 658, 663. Beseler and Williams assert that the Court admitted
exporters in Allied Corporation v. Commission, Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1005, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, because the Court adopted its line
of reasoning from the competition case IBM v. Commission, Case 60/81, 1981
E.C.R. 2639, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8708. J. BESELER AND A. WILLIAMS, supra
note 10, at 247-48. In IBM, the Court stated that
any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affect-
ing the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his
legal position is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action
under Article 173 for a declaration that it is void. However, the form in
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advisor to the Commission also suggests that independent im-
porters who have posted security for provisional duties might
be admitted to the Court of Justice to challenge the definitive
collection of provisional duties.2 73 These importers are identi-
fiable and fixed in number, and thus, a regulation providing for
the collection of the secured amounts constitutes a decision
concerning only those parties and is of direct and individual
concern to them.2 74 Furthermore, in instances where a regula-
tion imposes a definitive duty and orders the definitive collec-
tion of provisional duties, the importer may "be able to use
arguments which would ... call in question the validity of the
definitive duties, although they would not have standing to
challenge them directly. 275
The Court, however, should revise its admissibility test so
that independent importers may challenge the imposition of a
definitive duty even where an importer may not have pending
any binding contracts or where the Commission has not used
the independent importer's pricing information to construct
the export price.2 7 6 In such cases, the Court should determine
which such acts or decisions are cast is, in principle, immaterial as regards
the question whether they are open to challenge under that article.
Id. at 2651, 1 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8708, at 8464. Beseler and Williams
thus opined that
[pirovisional duties are binding on exporters and importers, whose interest
they affect by bringing about a "distinct change" in their legal position. In-
dividual importers are charged with the provisional duty and, even if the
financial burden of the securities requested is limited, the imposition of pro-
visional duties may, nevertheless, "compel the undertaking concerned to al-
ter or reconsider its marketing practices."
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 247-48. Accordingly, the independent
importers who pay the duty and may revise their list of suppliers should be admitted
to the Court to challenge the imposition of a provisional duty.
273. See Temple Lang, supra note 56, at 657.
274. Id. at 657. Temple Lang asserts that where a regulation contains a provi-
sion for the definitive collection of provisional duties and the imposition of definitive
duties, an importer may be able to question the validity of the definitive duties but
would not have standing to challenge them directly. Id.
275. Id.
276. In Allied, the Court held that an applicant who was identified in the regula-
tion or was concerned by the preliminary investigation is admissible under Article
173. Allied Corporation v. Commission,Joined Cases 239 & 275/82, 1984 E.C.R. at
1030, 1 12, 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,084, at 15,127; seesupra notes 177-
86 and accompanying text. In that case, however, the Court denied admission to an
independent importer that exclusively imported from one the producers charged
with dumping. Allied Corporation, 1984 E.C.R. at 1031, 15, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,084, at 15,127. The Court noted that, in this case, the Commission did
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admissibility with regard to whether the importer had partici-
pated in the investigation 277 and had imported significant
quantities of the product under investigation. These factors,
linked to the procedural rights provided importers, would pro-
vide an adequate reason for direct judicial review. The Court
would not be subjected to a dramatic increase in direct actions,
because these factors would serve also to limit those de minimis
cases where an importer does not purchase significant quanti-
ties of the product under investigation to warrant judicial re-
view.
Finally, the Court has been criticized for the manner in
which the export price has been calculated to determine ad-
missibility (as in Ball Bearings where associated importers were
admitted).2 78 One commentator notes that use of the export
price is one of many factors considered in an antidumping in-
vestigation and that there is no apparent reason for the Court
to use it to determine admissibility. 279 Therefore, the Court
should consider all relevant information, which would include
arguments that may be offered by an independent importer as
well.
not use the importer's pricing information to construct the export price. Id.; see E.
VERMULST, supra note 11, at 274 (Importers are in a predicament because access to
judicial review under Article 173 is dependent upon its relation to the exporter; that
is, whether there is an "association or compensatory relationship" and upon whether
the Commission views this relationship as "unreliable.").
277. Bellis, supra note 54, at 550. Bellis suggests determining admissibility
solely on whether the importer had participated in the proceedings and not by
whether the Commission used the applicant's pricing information. Id. at 550. Com-
pare id. with Mancini, supra note 67, at 203. Mancini notes that in competition cases,
where interested parties may request that the Commission investigate alleged in-
fringements of antitrust laws, after Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R.
1875, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7848, the Court seemed to relax the
admissibility test and considered only whether the applicant had an overriding inter-
est in verifying whether the competition rules had been properly applied. Mancini,
supra note 67, at 203. However, Mancini asserts that an admissibility test based on
whether the applicant participated in the administrative investigation or is a com-
plainant is not a decisive guide. See id. Instead, Mancini argues that an applicant,
even one that did not participate in the investigation, should be admitted if the
"Commission's action would prejudice a legal position of [the applicant] . . . that is
directly protected by Community antitrust rules." Id.
278. Bellis, supra note 54, at 550.
279. See id.
725
726 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
In the past decade the Court of Justice has established it-
self as the court of appeals for reviewing antidumping regula-
tions challenged by non-EEC producers, exporters, and their
EEC subsidiaries; EEC producers; and trade associations (in an
antisubsidy case). The Court has developed expertise in this
area and has relieved itself of many cases that will now be han-
dled by the Court of First Instance. Thus, the Court of Justice
should now agree to review direct actions by independent
Community importers who have participated in the investiga-
tion before the Commission and the Council and have im-
ported more than a de minimis amount of the product in ques-
tion. Such a result is fairest to importers and gives to them
direct judicial review where an antidumping regulation is of di-
rect and individual concern.
Meg A. Mataraso*
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Fordham University School of Law.
